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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal bank capital requirements when regulation can be diﬀerentiated
according to banks’ heterogeneous risk-assessment capabilities. The new Basel II Accord provides
the opportunity to do by introducing distinct regulatory systems for banks authorized to apply
internal ratings and externally rated banks. We show that optimal policies provide incentives to
specialize: sophisticated banks should be directed towards low-risk loan portfolios and be allowed
to grow, whereas banks with less developed rating systems should be regulated as niche players
that absorb a maximum of the unavoidable systematic risk in the banking sector. The coexistence
of two capital adequacy standards dominates a market structure in which all banks migrate to one
regulatory regime. We analyze the moral hazard problem that sophisticated banks may misreport
the true risk of their assets, and show that it will reduce the optimal level of diﬀerentiation
between the two types of banks, but not eliminate the advantage of two coexisting standards. We
address the problem of banks deploying internal rating systems without information sharing, and
show that this may accelerate the adoption of diﬀerentiated regulation.
Key words: bank capital regulation, capital adequacy, bank competition, risk-taking, Basel
Accord, internal ratings.
JEL classiﬁcation: K13, H41In a world of rapid ﬁnancial innovation, the prudential regulation of banks faces numerous
challenges. The scope and complexity of assets into which banks invest is now much larger than
only a decade ago. In addition, sophisticated banks have developed advanced information systems
to evaluate risks of loans and other assets, but they typically do not share with regulators the
knowledge provided by these (increasingly electronic) systems. Banks are increasingly nimble at
undertaking “regulatory arbitrage” in order to reduce the cost of capital requirements or other
regulations that potentially put them at a disadvantage compared with less regulated ﬁnancial
entities. For example, they prefer to invest into assets that bear small capital requirements
compared to the true risk levels (and risk premia), and they can structure funding commitments
in ways that keep them oﬀ-balance sheet and out of the immediate reach of capital requirements.
The new Basel II Accord is set to modernize the prudential regulation of banks, in particular
along two dimensions. First, by giving banks the right incentives to hold assets with appropriate
risks in their portfolios. The new rules proposed by the Basel Committee1 are intended to tailor the
minimum capital requirements more accurately to the true credit risk aﬀorded by each individual
bank loan or other asset. Second, by giving incentives to share information about the quality of
these assets with regulators in exchange for an attractive regulatory environment.
Central to the new Basel II Accord is the concept that regulators directly use the information
contained in the risk-assessment systems of private banks in order to gauge the credit risk associ-
ated with theses loans and the necessary capital requirements. However, such a policy is currently
appropriate only for the most advanced banks. The Basel Committee, therefore, proposes a two-
layer approach by distinguishing between the Standard Approach (SA) and the Internal Ratings
Based Approach (IRB). Under the SA regulation which applies to banks that are not yet ready
for the full implementation of Basel II rules, certiﬁed credit rating agencies will assign risk coef-
ﬁcients to bank loans and other bank assets, and for commercial bank loans without an external
rating, the risk weight will be assumed to be 100%. By contrast, under the IRB regulation, banks
will be authorized to undertake the risk classiﬁcation of assets themselves according to their own
1See Basel Committee (2004). The proposal provides for three distinct pillars of banking regulation, (i) standards
for capital adequacy, (ii) banking supervision and (iii) market discipline. In this paper, we will exclusively focus
on the most prominent of these pillars, the one on capital adequacy. While the pillars are probably regulatory
substitutes to some extent (this has been pointed out e.g. by Acharya, 2003; Decamps, Rochet and Roger, 2004 or
Morrison and White, 2004), our perspective is the optimal design of the capital adequacy pillar, once the optimal
weight for each of the three pillars is determined.
1credit scoring models. The Basel Committee plans to set a high regulatory standard for banks
operating under the IRB approach, but wants to increase the attractiveness of investing into the
IRB approval process. Therefore, the Committee will oﬀer a reduction of 2-3% in the required
capital, compared with the capital needed for the same risk-weighted asset portfolio under SA.
The two-layer approach is likely to profoundly aﬀect the capacity to make informed lending
decisions, the level of competition and of interest rates, the charter value and the failure risk of
banks. The ﬁrst objective of our paper is to analyze how such a two-layer approach will aﬀect
the market shares of banks operating under IRB relative to banks operating under SA rules, and
to determine the optimal size of the IRB-bank segment. The proposed Basel II Accord has so far
only been studied with respect to a single bank or in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. the
eﬀect on the market structure of the banking sector has been neglected.
Many banks decided to invest into better risk-assessment systems independently of the antic-
ipated regulatory environment, and the development of their systems is advanced at the time of
the Basel II implementation. According to a widely held view, the result of these investments
is a widening information gap between banks and regulators, and the main role of the Basel II
approach is to narrow this gap by providing incentives for banks to share their internal ratings
information with regulators. A third objective of our study is to determine under what cir-
cumstances banks would voluntarily disclose their private investments in improved credit scoring
systems to the regulator in order to beneﬁt from favorable capital requirements.
The Basel Accord will eﬀectively delegate the power to determine the capital requirements
for individual assets to the IRB-banks themselves. This raises genuine concerns about possible
agency conﬂicts as banks can use this decentralization to reduce their overall required capital.
Our ﬁnal objective is thus to analyze the agency problem of misreporting portfolio risks in the
context of two other incentive problems, bank risk-taking and banks’ adoption of unregulated
advanced scoring systems, and to study the possible interaction of these problems.2
We consider a model with two banks that choose between investing in safe projects character-
2Within the IRB-approach, the Basel Committee distinguishes between a foundation approach and an advanced
approach. Under the foundation approach, the IRB-banks’ own assessment is restricted to the probability of
default (PD), whereas advanced IRB-banks use their own systems also to estimate the loss given default (LGD)
and the exposure at default (EAD) (see Basel Committee (2004), Part 2, III). Though interesting, this distinction is
neglected in this paper as in our model the expected loss, the product of PD and LGD, determines the contribution
of each project to the social cost of bank failure.
2ized by idiosyncratic risk and in risky projects with substantial systematic risk. Initially, neither
banks nor regulators can discriminate between safe and risky projects. Banks, however, have the
option to invest in an improved credit scoring system that enables them to screen between safe
and risky projects. With this investment, banks qualify for the use of the IRB-approach. The
interest rates for safe and risky projects are determined endogenously.
We assume initially that the regulator can perfectly verify the screening information obtained
by banks, and we consider the case of one bank that invests to become an IRB-bank. The optimal
regulation of risk-adjusted capital requirements provides incentives for the IRB-bank to adopt
safe projects and to limit its risk exposure to the maximum that it can cover with its own equity.
While the IRB-bank remains default-free, the SA-bank adopts a risky portfolio and is exposed
to substantial failure risk. The reason is that there are economies of scale in the absorption of
bank default risks: the more asymmetric the allocation of bankruptcy risk across banks, the lower
the social cost of bank default. As a result, the regulator prefers to conﬁne default risk to one
bank and to keep that bank small. The two-layer approach of the Basel II regime allows the
regulator to assign lower average capital requirements to the IRB-bank compared with the SA-
bank.3 This diﬀerentiation will increase the portfolio quality and market share of the IRB-bank,
whereas quality and market share of the SA-bank decrease, providing a rationale that banks that
can maintain a low default risk should be allowed to grow.
We then consider whether both banks should become IRB-banks. In this case as well, banks
will adopt maximally diﬀerentiated portfolios, with one bank specializing in safe projects and the
other bank in risky projects. The allocation with two IRB-banks, however, has two disadvantages:
ﬁrst, the same capital requirements apply to both banks, so that no size diﬀerentiation is possible.
Second, the competition between banks is heightened as they are in an equal position on both
loan markets, which will lead to lower lending rates and thus expose banks to a larger default
risk. Both eﬀects imply a strictly inferior overall allocation of portfolio and risks compared to the
case with only one IRB-bank. Moreover, if the regulator has enough discretion to encourage or
discourage investments in internal rating systems then the coexistence of SA-banks and IRB-banks
can always be implemented.
This comparison highlights the diseconomies if all banks make the transition to the same
regulatory status. In our model, the coexistence of SA-banks alongside IRB-banks is optimal as
3This is also the stated intention of the Basel Committee, but while the Basel Committee wants to apply favorable
ratios to induce investment, we show that they should only be used to regulate portfolio size and composition.
3it allows to conﬁne a maximum of the unavoidable aggregate risk in the banking sector to a niche
of tightly regulated SA-banks. While our analysis conﬁrms that SA-banks will suﬀer from the
transition to Basel II by moving to smaller and lower-quality loan portfolios, it emphasizes that
this transition has positive eﬀects overall. Our analysis suggests that there should be a yardstick
that separates between more and less advanced banks, given their heterogeneous starting positions.
We then introduce the incentive problem that banks can misrepresent the risk of individual
projects. We consider the extreme case where the regulator must fully rely on banks’ reports. In
this case, the regulator’s capacity to tailor capital requirements to actual loan failure risks appears
to break down since IRB-banks will be able to misreport their portfolios in favor of projects with
the lowest risk weight. We show, however, that the consequences of this incentive problem for
the overall allocation are far less dramatic than one might have expected since the beneﬁcial
diﬀerentiation eﬀect still exists. The additional constraints caused by the incentive problem
imply that the IRB-bank will often have a smaller portfolio than under perfect information, in
particular if risk-taking is attractive or if the bank is poorly capitalized. Still, a banking sector
with one IRB-bank is superior to two IRB-banks.
An important additional analysis concerns the possibility that banks invest in internal rating
systems without applying for an IRB-status. We ﬁnd that the regulator always prefers IRB-banks
to unregulated banks with an internal rating system. This leads to a useful retrospective on the
Basel I-regulation: Even in cases in which Basel II is exposed to problems of excessive investment
in internal rating systems it is typically superior to the old Basel I rules as it allows to diﬀerentiate
optimally between two segments of the banking sector.
There is a vast literature on the optimal regulation of bank capital and its relationship to
risk-taking that is surveyed in Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998) and Allen (2004). Acharya
(2001) endogenizes the choice of systematic risk in a bank loan portfolio and discusses the reg-
ulatory consequences. Tighter capital requirements have been argued to increase risk-taking
incentives (Thakor, 1996; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996) or to reduce them (Repullo, 2004). Our
study of the relationship between competition and risk-taking in banking is in accordance with
a substantial literature. Matutes and Vives (1996) show that reduced banking competition mit-
igates risk-taking incentives. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) also emphasize negative
eﬀects of strong competition, and Boot and Greenbaum (1993) argue that excessive risk-taking
can be mitigated by reputation eﬀects that in turn depend on imperfect competition.
The problem that banks may understate their portfolio risk when using internal ratings has
4been addressed by Morrison and White (2005), Marshall and Venkatamaran (1999), Dangl and
Lehar (2004) and Pelizzon and Schaefer (2005) who argue that the beneﬁt from internal ratings
depends on the regulator’s capacity to monitor and to deter banks from cheating. Gersbach and
Wehrspohn (2001) argue that banks will underinvest in their scoring models because they will
identify bad loans more often, which leads to higher capital requirements with internal ratings.
There is little previous work on the impact of Basel II on the riskiness of IRB-banks and SA-
banks. Rime (2005) discusses the adverse eﬀect of Basel II on the loan quality of unsophisticated
banks. Close in spirit is Repullo and Suarez (2004) who model a competitive banking sector
where borrowers choose between IRB-banks and SA-banks. In their paper, IRB-banks will always
specialize in riskier projects, and the average interest rate after Basel II decreases. In our model,
both cherry-picking and risk-shifting is possible, and the interest rate increases if IRB-banks
prefer cherry-picking, so that our conclusions are strikingly diﬀerent from theirs. The reason is
that, contrary to our analysis, they do not choose capital requirements to maximize social welfare
and do not consider bank moral hazard, since their focus is on simulating the general equilibrium
eﬀects of Basel II. Hakenes and Schnabel (2007) emphasize competition for liabilities among banks
with diﬀerent screening capabilities, whereas we focus on competition for assets. Similar to our
model, they ﬁnd that the choice between the SA- and the IRB-approach may lead to more risk
being adopted by less sophisticated banks.
In empirical work on potential impacts of the Basel II Accord, a substantial literature has fo-
c u s e do nt h el i k e l yp r o c y c l i c a le ﬀects, starting with Altman and Saunders (2001) who demonstrate
that external ratings and hence the SA component of Basel II would likely to be procyclical. Peura
and Jokivuolle (2004) ﬁnd a comparable procyclical eﬀect for internal rating systems. While our
study is tangential to this discussion, it shows that SA-banks specializing in poor-quality loans
are likely to absorb a disproportionate share of procyclical variations, because of optimal portfolio
rebalancing between the two types of banks rather than because of rating changes. The litera-
ture investigating the consistency of internal and external ratings to predict default risks includes
Carey (2002), Gropp and Richards (2001) and Claessens and Embrechts (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model. Section II lays the ground-
work by analyzing bank proﬁts and social welfare in the case of two SA-banks and by deriving
general conditions for the portfolio choice of banks. Section III analyzes the scenario in which the
banks’ loan portfolio choice is observable to the regulator. Section IV analyzes the scenario of un-
observable loan portfolios. In Section V we discuss possible extensions and Section VI concludes.
5I. The Model
In our model, the banking sector consists of two banks, Bank A and Bank B. Banks are risk
neutral and have identical equity of E. There is a continuum of projects with a total measure of
one that they can ﬁnance. Costs of all projects are normalized to a unit of investment, i.e. funds
worth n are needed to ﬁnance a portfolio of Lebesgue measure n ≤ 1. 1
2 of the projects are “safe”,
and 1
2 of them are “risky”. Safe projects yield a gross cash ﬂow (rate of return plus one) XS > 2
with probability k ≥ 1
2, and zero with probability 1 − k. Safe projects are uncorrelated, meaning
that the return of any measurable portfolio of n safe projects will be exactly knXS. Risky projects
yield a cash ﬂow of XR with probability 1
2, and nothing with probability 1
2. Risky projects are
strongly correlated, so that they represent systematic risk. To capture this in a simple way, we
assume that a portfolio of measure n of risky projects yields tnXR,w h e r et ∈ [0,1] is a uniformly
distributed random variable. Thus, t indicates the realization of the systematic risk in the loan
portfolio.4
A bank failure involves a real cost for society that consists of the disappearance of the or-
ganizational capital, know-how and proprietary knowledge of borrower relationships of the bank
and the disruption of the ﬁnancing and payment ﬂows for the bank’s borrowers and lenders. We
assume that this type of social costs of a bankruptcy is proportional to the size of bank’s assets,
i.e. the number n of projects that it ﬁnances, and can hence be captured by zn.W ed e n o t et h e
expected bankruptcy loss by Z = zn·Prob(bankruptcy).5
Initially, both banks A and B have low quality rating systems that cannot distinguish between
safe and risky projects. Banks with low rating systems are called SA-banks as they will be
regulated according to the Standard Approach. Each bank i ∈ {A,B} can, however, make an
investment Ci ≥ 0 to build an internal rating system. We assume that CA <C B to capture the
idea that there is heterogeneity among banks concerning their readiness to adopt internal rating
systems.6 When investing Ci,B a n ki acquires an internal rating system (IRS) that allows it to
4Since risky projects have a higher systematic risk and higher beta than safe projects, we would typically observe
that XR ≥ 2kXS in a market equilibrium, but the relationship between XR and XS plays no role in our analysis.
5This assumption could be relaxed, for example to allow for increasing contagion eﬀects that go beyond the
assumed proportional bankruptcy costs. The essential assumption for our analysis is that it does not make a
diﬀerence whether one bank with n projects goes bankrupt or whether two banks go bankrupt that jointly ﬁnance
n projects.
6If CA = CB, mixed equilibria in pure strategies would sometimes obtain, but this would not change our results
6perfectly screen between safe and risky projects and we will refer to it as an IRS-bank. Under
Basel II, an IRS-bank can decide to be regulated according to the Internal Ratings Based (IRB)
Approach. In this case, the bank will be called an IRB-bank.
We consider two diﬀerent scenarios to analyze the impact of potential agency problems on the
eﬃciency of Basel II: under the observable scenario, we assume that the regulator can observe the
loan portfolio of IRB-banks. This is not possible under the unobservable scenario in which the
regulator is entirely dependent on the banks’ reports.
Under the Basel II approach, the regulator can set diﬀerent capital requirements bS and bR
for safe and for risky projects. We assume that bS ≤ bR to capture one of the main purposes of
Basel II, namely to impose higher capital standards on riskier loans. The possibility to diﬀerentiate
between bS and bR, however, applies only to IRB-banks. For SA-banks, neither banks nor external
rating agencies can distinguish between projects so that the regulator needs to apply a uniform
ratio bU. For the most part, we also make the assumption that bS ≤ bU, i.e. that the regulator
cannot demand higher capital requirements for safe projects than for unidentiﬁed projects that
represent a combination of risky and safe projects. This assumption, which is realistic in the
context of the Basel II discussions, allows us to limit the complexity of the analysis.7
Besides the capital requirements bS,b R, and bU, the regulator can encourage or discourage
investments by a subsidy s>0 or a tax s<0 for IRB-banks.
Interest rates are determined endogenously in our model by competition between the two
banks. Diﬀerences in interest rates will reﬂect diﬀerent expected default rates.8 We denote the
interest factor (interest rate plus one) for risky projects by RR and for safe projects by RS,a n d
by RU the interest factor of SA-banks that cannot distinguish between safe and risky projects.
We assume that it is always possible for a safe project to masquerade as a risky project, even
when screened by a bank that has an IRS-system (the converse does not hold, i.e. a risky project
cannot masquerade as a safe project). This assumption ensures that safe projects must be oﬀered
weakly lower interest rates in equilibrium, RS ≤ RR. This is a realistic implication, and we will
also brieﬂy discuss that it can be relaxed without aﬀecting our main results.
qualitatively.
7Our main ﬁndings do not depend on this asumption, in particular since in most cases bS ≤ bU would emerge
as the optimal regulation anyway. There is an exception that we brieﬂy discuss below but that has no impact on
our main results.
8Since banks are risk-neutral, the diﬀerence in systematic risk is not reﬂected in loan pricing.
7To tie down the determination of interest rates, we assume that ﬁnancial markets also provide
non-bank funding oﬀers (e.g. equity-based instruments, leasing, asset-backed loans, trade credit
or factoring). The potential competition from such non-banks are eﬀectively limits the interest
rates that banks can demand, and this is the only role of non-banks in our model. Bank funding is
more attractive for project owners as long as bank interest rates do not exceed a certain limit. We
assume this limit to be uniform since non-banks cannot distinguish between the two project types,
and for simplicity ﬁxi ta tal e v e lo fR =2 , the minimum level that guarantees a break-even of
non-banks on every project. This assumption is motivated by the two classical advantages of bank
oﬀers compared with non-bank lending, the larger expertise of banks in screening projects and
their competence in monitoring projects. We assume that bank ﬁnancing is the socially eﬃcient
funding choice for all projects in our model, say because it allows projects to generate (weakly)
larger gross cash ﬂows, so that it would be wasteful to tighten capital requirements so much that
some projects take recourse to non-bank sources.
To formalize competition between banks, we assume that ﬁrst SA-banks announce their in-
terest rates simultaneously and then IRS-banks set their rates. This timing gives a second mover
advantage to IRS-banks regardless of whether they are licensed as IRB-banks or not.9 We assume
that depositors of both banks are paid the risk-free interest rate of 0, independently of the actual
failure risk. Thus, we implicitly assume that there is a deposit insurance scheme in place that
eﬀectively covers all credit risk for the depositors of the two banks.10
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1. The regulator credibly commits to b and s.
Stage 2. Banks decide whether to invest, and if they do, whether to request an IRB-license.
Stage 3. SA-banks announce their interest rates simultaneously, followed by banks with an
IRS that also announce their interest rates simultaneously. Then each project chooses a bank
to which it makes a loan application. The bank makes a yes/no-decision on the loan. After a
negative decision, the project can apply to the other bank, and ﬁnally (with no loan approval
from either bank) to a non-bank ﬁnancier.
9IRS-banks have an informational advantage over SA-banks that explains that they are more likely to win any
bid competition for one of their preferred projects since they can undercut any competing oﬀer. The second-mover
advantage captures the idea of a bidding advantage in a simple way.
10We also assume that a bank’s deposit insurance premia do not depend on its current loan portfolio decision.
This allows us to ignore the impact of the endogenous default risk on the banks’ payment for deposit insurance.
8Stage 4. Nature decides upon the success of projects. This also determines if a bank is
insolvent or not.
An essential consideration for the regulator is that an increase in bank lending also increases
the bank failure risk. In order to tie down this relationship, we ﬁrst assume that E<1−k
2 .
This implies, as we will discuss, that if all projects are bank-ﬁnanced then at least one bank
faces insolvency risk; we exclude the opposite case since it would be uninteresting. Moreover, for
the essential part of our analysis, we assume that XS and XR are suﬃciently large so that the
regulator wants all projects to be funded. We will refer to this as Assumption L.11 This allows
us to avoid numerous case distinctions that would disrupt the ﬂow of our exposition. It implies
that we disregard any impact of banks’ investments in screening technologies on the total lending
volume in the economy. Rather, we focus on the eﬃcient allocation of loans between banks. We
relegate the interesting question how bank regulation and total lending volume interact to Section
V. where we brieﬂy discuss the consequences of relaxing Assumption L.
II. Elements of the Analysis
A. Two SA-banks
We start with the case where neither bank invests into an IRS. Both banks are SA-banks that
cannot distinguish between project types, and they are regulated by bU (“uninformed”) and can
fund nu ≤ E
bU projects. This case is in many ways similar to the situation under Basel I rules, but
not quite: under Basel I rules, the regulator cannot distinguish between project types, but banks
might nevertheless invest in superior screening skills. Basel I with investment is akin to our case
of unregulated IRS-investments,12 and we will discuss this case in Sections III..4 and IV..4.
Moving backwards, we ﬁrst analyze proﬁts and bankruptcy risks as a function of nu (stage 3),
and then turn to the regulator’s choice of bU (stage 1). Since banks cannot discriminate between
safe and risky projects, they propose the same interest factor RU to both types of projects, and
each loan portfolio consists of nu
2 safe and nu
2 risky projects.
For given nu and E, the bank will avoid insolvency if t is large enough so that the bank’s
11As u ﬃcient condition for Assumption L to hold in all situations is that min{XR,X S} ≥ 2+z.
12The awareness of the growing screening skills of banks and their possibility to exploit the inconsistencies in the
coarse Basel I grid of capital requirements is an important motivation behind the Basel II process.






tRU + E − nu ≥ 0.( 1 )
Let ˜ tu denote the minimum value of t satisfying (1). Because t is uniformly distributed over
the unit interval, ˜ tu conveniently embodies also the bankruptcy probability. The expected proﬁt
per bank (we will always look at gross proﬁts that include bank equity E)i s
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´
.( 2 )
This equation says that if the bank avoids insolvency, which it does with probability 1 − ˜ tu,
then the return from nu






RU = 1+˜ tu
2 RU,r e ﬂecting the conditional expectation of t ≥ ˜ tu. Furthermore, the
bank owns E and invests nu.
The insolvency threshold ˜ tu is reached when the return to the bank, including its capital
reserves E, is just enough to satisfy (1),
˜ tu =m a x
½









(2E − 2nu + RUnu + RUknu)
2 .( 4 )
Because banks do not have to pay for the losses if they become bankrupt, Πu is strictly
increasing in nu which is straightforward to show. Hence, SA-banks fund as many projects as
possible, meaning that in equilibrium nu = E
bU .
Following Assumption L, the regulator proposes bU =2 E or nu = 1
2, so that all projects
will ﬁnd bank ﬁnancing. bU =2 E ensures that banks are capacity-constrained in equilibrium,
and propose the maximum rate RU =2that stems from the potential competition of non-bank
ﬁnanciers. Note that any bU < 2E would be inferior as banks could ﬁnance more than all available
projects. Competition for projects would then lead to RU < 2, and hence to higher expected
bankruptcy costs. Thus, bU =2 E and RU =2is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
This leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 With two SA-banks, the regulator proposes bU =2 E. Each bank funds nu =
1
2 projects and earns proﬁts of Πu = 1
4 (2E + k)
2. Total expected bankruptcy costs are Zu =
z (1 − 2E − k).
10Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the expression for bankruptcy costs Zu shows that the bankruptcy probability will
always be strictly positive since we assumed that E<1−k
2 . Our analysis shows that even though
the two banks are symmetric and in Bertrand competition on the loan market, they earn a positive
proﬁt and thus have a charter value. The reason is that the regulator implements a quantity limit
in lending via the capital requirement bU, so that interest rates are not determined by Bertrand
competition but by the ceiling imposed by non-bank ﬁnanciers. Thus, banks make a proﬁta s
they beneﬁt from the option value provided by a positive bankruptcy probability.
B. Choice of the Loan Portfolio
The portfolio choice of a bank that adopts an IRS is an important step of our analysis that we
will use extensively below. We analyze whether the bank prefers safe projects, risky projects, or
a mixed loan portfolio.
When choosing its loan portfolio, the bank faces a trade-oﬀ between safe projects that oﬀer
better quality expressed by k>0.5 and risky projects that oﬀer the option to beneﬁtf r o mt h e
limited liability eﬀect. Let us assume that an IRS-bank, say Bank A, ﬁnances a given number of
projects nA,o fw h i c hnA
S are safe and nA −nA
S are risky. By analogy to the proﬁtf u n c t i o n( 2 )o f
a SA-bank, the IRS-bank’s proﬁt function is then13











+ E − nA¢
,( 5 )
where ˜ tA is the bankruptcy probability that increases in the fraction of the portfolio allocated to
risky loans, nA − nA
S,
˜ tA =m a x
(
















bS ≤ E. (7)
Safe projects generate a deterministic return conditional on the bank remaining solvent, so that,
independent of its overall portfolio and risk, the bank will only include safe projects in its portfolio
if they earn a nonnegative return, RS ≥ 1
k. We can safely limit attention to this case since RS < 1
k
13RS and RR denote interest factors for safe and risky projects.
14bS and bR denote capital ratios for safe and risky projects.
11cannot occur in equilibrium. We can then identify the following fundamental portfolio allocation
rule:
Lemma 1 A Bank that adopts an IRS will strictly prefer either safe or risky projects. That is,






of its preferred project type j ∈ {R,S},
and it will use its residual bank equity for projects of the other type if interest rates are suﬃcient
to earn a proﬁt.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that an IRS-bank ﬁrst adopts only either safe or risky projects and then ﬁlls
the remainder of its lending capacity with the other project type provided the latter earn a proﬁt.
We will refer to the ﬁr s tc a s ea scherry-picking, and to the second case as risk-shifting.T h e
intuition is that the bank’s proﬁt ΠA is a call option on the true value of the loan portfolio, and
the expected value of this call option exhibits the usual convex shape as a function of the risk
choice. Thus, there is no interior solution, and the bank will prefer either safe or risky projects.
The Lemma has two important implications: ﬁrst, the bank will always prefer safe projects
if there is no bankruptcy risk when choosing risky projects ﬁrst. Second, choosing either safe or
risky projects ﬁrst yields strictly higher proﬁts then the mixed allocation with two SA-banks, i.e.
ΠA > Πu if R and nA are identical. In the next sections, we will analyze how the decision between
risk-shifting and cherry-picking depends on nA, and how - in turn - this decision inﬂuences the
regulator’s choice of nA in the SPE.
III. Observable Loan Portfolios
We can now consider the portfolio choice of banks and the optimal regulation if at least one bank
becomes an IRB-bank.15 We start with the case in which the regulator can observe the loan
portfolio, and we proceed as follows: we analyze the optimal capital requirements separately for
the scenario with one IRB-bank and with two IRB-banks, respectively, and then compare the two
allocations and determine the optimal size of the IRB-bank segment.
15The case of uncertiﬁed investment is considered at the end of this Section.
12A. One IRB-Bank
When portfolios are observable and there is only one IRB-bank, the regulator can implement
any project split by adjusting capital requirements (bR,b S,b U) appropriately. Total expected
bankruptcy costs are minimized by diﬀerentiating between the IRB-bank and the SA-bank - the
IRB-bank funds all safe projects and so many risky projects that it has no bankruptcy risk. The
SA-bank funds all remaining projects. The regulator’s objective function is (under Assumption
L) to minimize the expected bankruptcy costs that we denote by Zo(1) for the case with one
IRB-bank and observable loan portfolios. This leads to the following outcome:
Proposition 2 With one IRB-bank and observable portfolios, bU = E




. The IRB-bank ﬁnances nA = E + k projects, and its portfolio comprises all safe projects
and E + k − 1
2 risky projects. The SA-bank funds nB =1− E − k projects that are all risky.
Interest rates for safe and risky projects are RS = RR =2 . Only the SA-bank faces bankruptcy
risk, and total expected bankruptcy costs are Zo(1) = z 1−2E−k
2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
The essential element of Proposition 2 is that in the optimal allocation, the IRB-bank will
never be bankrupt; its payoﬀ will be just zero in the extreme systematic risk event t =0 . The SA-
bank, by contrast, has substantial failure risk even though it is the smaller bank, as a consequence
of its risky-only loan portfolio. This allocation is optimal as it shelters as many projects as possible
from bankruptcy risk. The social cost of default is minimized if a relatively small lending volume
is allocated to the riskier bank and a relatively large portfolio to the less risky bank.16
Proposition 2 expresses an insight that plays an important role in our analysis: because the
bankruptcy probability increases at a decreasing rate as a bank adopts more risky projects, there
is an economies-of-scale eﬀect in the allocation of bankruptcy risk, making an unequal allocation
of overall failure risk optimal. A major advantage of Basel II is that it allows to diﬀerentiate
between two segments of the banking sector: the IRB-bank should have regulatory rates that
entice it to ﬁnance low-risk projects, and which avoid the risk of default. The fact that IRB-
banks pick safer projects will inevitably deteriorate the average quality of remaining projects
available for SA-banks so that poorly skilled banks are becoming more fragile. However, this
16This allocation is only optimal if the IRB-bank indeed prefers to fund safe projects. With the capital require-
ments of Proposition 2, this is the case as the IRB-bank cannot fund more than E + k −
1
2 risky projects.
13asymmetry caused by Basel II is just the consequence of the fact that all bank failure risk should
be insulated in the SA-segment of the banking sector.
B. Two IRB-Banks
If both banks become IRB-banks and observe perfect signals on the quality of each project,
there will be heightened competition for projects. We can quickly observe that there will be no
symmetric equilibrium in which banks have the same project mix. This follows from Lemma 1
that shows that banks strictly prefer one project type. Hence, banks would undercut each other’s
interest rate to either attract all safe or all risky projects.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, the two banks’ proﬁts will be identical, ΠA = ΠB. Furthermore,
to reduce the overall bankruptcy risk the regulator again sets capital requirements that lead to
binding equity constraints so that banks cannot undercut each other. Since capital requirements
are nonnegative, no bank can ﬁnance more than 3
4 of all projects (otherwise the equity constraint
w o u l db es l a c kf o ra tl e a s to n eb a n k ) .
It follows from the economies-of-scale eﬀect in absorbing failure risk that total expected bank-
ruptcy costs are minimized if one bank remains default-free and is larger than the other. This
bank, say Bank A, should fund all safe projects and the maximum number of risky projects that
allows it to remain default-free. Again, the regulator has an incentive to implement the maximum
feasible interest rates RS = RR =2by making the equity capital ratios binding. Then, however,
proﬁts of the two banks would normally be unequal. This means that the regulator cannot in
fact eschew competitive pressure on interest rates. There are two cases to be considered: in the
ﬁrst case, Bank A w o u l de a r nh i g h e rp r o ﬁts when RS = RR =2so that Bank B would undercut
Bank A. In equilibrium, the safe rate will adjust downwards to a level RS < 2 that leads to proﬁt
equality, ΠA = ΠB, whereas the risky rate remains at the noncompetitive level RR =2 .W i t h








In the second case, Bank A w o u l de a r nl o w e rp r o ﬁts with RS = RR =2if Bank A is risk-free
while Bank B ﬁnances only risky projects. This case will occur if k is below a certain threshold
ˆ k(E) that we derive in the Appendix. Thus, the desired allocation with one risk-free and one
risky bank would require RS <R R to equilibrate proﬁts. This, however, is impossible since ﬁrms
having safe projects will not accept higher interest rates but will pretend that their projects are
14risky. Furthermore, the regulator can not increase the proﬁt of the risk-free Bank A by allocating
more projects to the bank - as long as the bank is risk-free, its proﬁts are independent of the
number of risky projects. It follows that there is no asymmetric equilibrium where Bank A is
risk-free: As long as projects are distinguishable, the risk free Bank A h a sa l w a y sa ni n c e n t i v et o
acquire Bank B’s portfolio by oﬀering a lower interest rate for risky projects, RR < 2. But then,
safe project will imitate, project types are indistinguishable, and both banks fund identical mixed
portfolios. We summarize:
Proposition 3 With two IRB-banks and observable portfolios, proﬁts are equal, ΠA = ΠB.T h e r e







projects and is default-free, and interest rates are RR =2 , RS ≤ 2. (ii) If
k ≤ ˆ k(E) then each bank funds half of all safe and half of all risky projects, and RS = RR =2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
T h ee q u i l i b r i u ml a i do u ti nP r o p o s i t i o n3i sd r i v e nb yt h es a m el o g i ct h a ti sb e h i n dt h ec a s e
of one IRB-bank in Proposition 2. The regulator wants to shelter as many projects as possible
from bankruptcy risk by allocating them to one bank that remains default-free. However, when
both banks are IRB-banks, then each bank can compete for the other bank’s portfolio by cutting
rates, and banks will undercut each other until in equilibrium their proﬁts are equal. Case (i) of
Proposition 3 depicts the situation in which the more attractive position is that of the default-free
bank. Hence, rate competition between the two banks will lower the safe rate RS until the proﬁt
of the default-free bank A is depressed down to that of Bank B. The regulator would clearly
prefer a higher rate RS but cannot prevent the rate competition between the two IRB-banks.
This explains that the lending volume of the default-free bank is lower compared to the case of
one IRB-bank.
From the regulator’s point of view, the situation is worse in case (ii),t h es i t u a t i o ni nw h i c h
a risky loan portfolio is more attractive than a safe portfolio. If banks were specializing in their
loan portfolios as predicted by Lemma 1, then rate competition between the two banks would
exert downwards pressure on the risky rate RR. However, higher interest rates for safe projects
are not possible in equilibrium, since safe projects would then masquerade as risky projects to
beneﬁt from a better rate. Therefore, specialized loan portfolios are no longer feasible, and we get
the same allocation as with two SA-banks even though banks now have the heightened screening
15capabilities of their IRS-systems. The role of the regulator is limited to reducing rate competition
so that R =2in equilibrium for both project types.
C. Comparison and Optimal Regulation
We can now compare the expected minimal bankruptcy costs with one IRB-bank, two IRB-banks
and two SA-banks, respectively. Denoting by Zo(2) the minimal expected bankruptcy costs in
the case with two IRB-banks and observable loan portfolios, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 4 With observable portfolios, total expected bankruptcy costs are lower with one
IRB-bank compared with two IRB-banks or two SA-banks, Zo(1) < min{Zo(2),Z u}.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is that, with two IRB-banks, the regulator cannot diﬀerentiate
between the capital requirements of the two banks which leads to overall risk allocations that are
strictly inferior to that with only one IRB-bank. In case (i) of Proposition 3, RS < 2 implies
a smaller portfolio for the default-free bank A and hence larger expected bankruptcy costs for
Bank B.17 And in case (ii) of Proposition 3, the allocation is the same as with two SA-banks.
By contrast, when there is only one IRB-bank then the regulator can implement the optimal
allocation of projects between banks, and RS = RR =2 .
W h i l ew eh a v es e e nt h a tb a n k r u p t c yc o s t sa r eminimized with one IRB-bank, we need to take
into account investment costs CA (the cost of the bank that can become an IRB-bank at a lower
cost) to determine the overall optimal regime. Depending on CA, either one IRB-bank or two
SA-banks are optimal.
As the criteria for the investment decision of Bank A do typically not coincide with the
regulator’s preferences, we now analyze whether the regulator can implement the optimal regime
via subsidies (s>0)a n dt a x e s( s<0) for investments. To discuss this discrepancy of objectives,
we will call an overinvestment situation any set of parameters that lead to Zu − Zo(1) <C A ≤
Πo(1) − Πu, i.e. a case in which the social beneﬁt from investment is negative while Bank A will
earn a positive net proﬁt when investing. We call the opposite case, Zu−Zo(1) ≥ CA > Πo(1)−Πu,
17Both cases Zo(2) <Z u and Zo(2) ≥ Zu can occur in this case depending on the parameters, but this case
distinction has no impact on the equilibrium ranking.
16an underinvestment problem. From the expressions derived earlier we ﬁnd that:
(Zu − Zo(1))−(Πo(1) − Πu)=z














This expression can be either positive or negative, as the following two boundary cases show:
For k close to 1 and z =1 , the expression will converge to −1
4 −E (1 − E) < 0;a n df o rE close to
0, k close to 1
2 and z =1 , it converges to 5
16 > 0. This ambiguity is intuitive since the objective
functions of bank and regulator diﬀer for two reasons: ﬁrst, the regulator takes account of social
costs of bank failure Z while the bank does not, and the bank is protected by limited liability while
the regulator takes the downside risk into account; second, the bank’s lending volume and proﬁt
will increase if it invests in an IRS (Propositions 2 and 3) whereas the regulator considers the
constant aggregate lending volume in the economy. The ﬁrst reason explains an underinvestment
bias, but the second reason tends to lead to overinvestment.
Overinvestment can easily be deterred by a tax. An underinvestment situation is more diﬃcult
to remedy: when the regulator chooses a subsidy to induce Bank A to invest, it needs to avoid
that at the same time this subsidy would lead Bank B to invest. We will show that this problem
will not occur if:
ΠA
o (1) − Πu > ˆ ΠB
o (2) − ΠB
o (1).( 8 )
Condition (8) says that Bank A’s decision to invest (transition from two SA-banks, Πu,t oo n e
IRB-bank, ΠA
o (1))w i l li n c r e a s eA’s proﬁt by more than Bank B’s decision to invest (transition
from being the only SA-bank, ΠB
o (1),t ob e i n gas e c o n dI R B - b a n k ,ˆ ΠB
o (2)) would increase B’s
proﬁt. The relevant capital requirements to be considered in this case are those for the case with
one IRB-bank as we need to consider a deviation from the equilibrium, which is the regulator’s
preferred allocation, and this is reﬂected in our notation ˆ ΠB
o (2).
Since by assumption CA <C B, the regulator can always ﬁnd subsidies or taxes such that
Bank A will invest while Bank B will not if condition (8) holds. Therefore, inequality (8) is a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with one IRB-bank.
We brieﬂy explain why condition (8) will always hold, leaving details to the Appendix. As
ΠA
o (1) > Πu, condition (8) holds if ΠB
o (1) ≥ ˆ ΠB
o (2).T h ee ﬀective capital requirement bS =0(see
Proposition 2) implies that there is no capital cost on safe projects so that Bertrand competition
between two IRB-banks would drive down interest rates for safe projects to the minimum RS = 1
k.
Moreover, if E + k ≤ 3
4, each bank can only ﬁnance E + k − 1




17that there is no competition for risky projects and RR =2 . However, if it decided to remain a
SA-bank, each bank could ﬁnance strictly more risky projects at the same interest rate, so that
ˆ ΠB
o (2) < ΠB
o (1).A n di fE + k>3
4, then competition will reduce interest rates for both types of
projects. There is a unique equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies, but in this equilibrium we
have ˆ ΠB
o (2) = ΠB
o (1) (see the Appendix). The analysis can be summarized as:
Proposition 5 With observable portfolios, the regulator can always uniquely implement the op-
timal outcome:
(i) If Zu − Zo(1) ≥ CA,o n l yB a n kA invests and ﬁnances nA = E + k. There is a subsidy if
CA > ΠA
o (1) − Πu.
(ii) If Zu − Zo(1) <C A, there will be two SA-banks. There is a tax on investment if CA <
ΠA
o (1) − Πu.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 conﬁrms that the optimal allocation is always uniquely attainable if the portfolio
allocations of the banks are observable.
D. Unregulated Investment
So far, we have neglected that one or two banks might invest in an IRS without requesting an
IRB-license. We will refer to this possibility as unregulated investments. An unregulated IRS
corresponds to a situation in which the bank does not divulge its internal ratings information
to the regulator. The situation in this case is similar to the Basel I regime where the regulator
cannot diﬀerentiate capital requirements across banks or across stated project types, and where
banks that invest and bank that do not will face the same uniform capital requirements. The
same is true under Basel II when IRS-investments are unregulated.
The analysis of unregulated investments is relevant for the discussion of bank regulation be-
cause it addresses the view that the major eﬀect of the IRB approach is to ensure that banks
give regulators access to the information provided by their advanced internal rating systems, and
that this eﬀect dominates the impact on incentives to invest into such systems. According to
this view, banks carry out investments in IRS-systems independently of regulation and are in
fact well-advanced in developing such systems, and the Basel II regulation is largely a reaction
to a largely accomplished change in bank industry practice. Thus, our analysis of unregulated
18investments sheds light on the Basel committee’s concern that the information gap between banks
and regulators is widening, and to its objective to narrow it by providing incentives that banks
share their internal rating information with regulators.
Hence, one insight of our model is that the objective of implementing full information sharing
between banks and regulator is tantamount to analyzing the incentive constraints that banks
submit their IRS-systems for IRB-approval.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which only one bank (say Bank A) invests. We consider the
case in which the regulator imposes a tax on a IRB-license because two SA-banks are optimal
when investment costs are taken into account. If Bank A undertakes an unregulated investment,
it can fund nA = 1







− Πu >C A.( 9 )
If condition (9) holds, the bank will invest even if Zu − Zo(1) <C A, and the regulator
will not be able to prevent overinvestment by Bank A. Then, the regulator’s best response is
to accommodate the investment and to give ﬁscal incentives to request an IRB-license. This
dominates unregulated investment as total bankruptcy costs are lower if Bank A applies for
the license and ﬁnances E + k − 1
2 projects instead of only 1
2.W e t h u s ﬁnd that investment
without requesting an IRB-license can never be a subgame perfect strategy. The option to do so,







− Πu >C A, even if the regulator prefers to have two SA-banks because
Zu − Zo(1) <C A.
We then consider the case in which both banks simultaneously consider to undertake unregu-
lated investments. If they do, then each bank will be able to fund 1
2 of the projects, and we get
two possible cases: an asymmetric equilibrium as in case (i) of Proposition 3 in which bank A
ﬁnances all safe and Bank B ﬁnances all risky projects, and where RS <R R =2 , and a symmetric
equilibrium as in case (ii) of Proposition 3 in which each bank ﬁnances half of both project types.
It is then straightforward to show that there is no equilibrium in which both banks undertake
unregulated investments. If one bank deviates and requests an IRB-license instead, it would be
subject to capital requirements that allow it to expand its lending to nA = E+k− 1
2 > 1
2 projects,
and the equilibrium interest rates were RS = RR =2 . Thus, such a deviation would earn higher





s denote proﬁts of Bank A when funding only risky or safe projects, respectively.
19will either not invest or become an IRB-bank as well, but it will never undertake an unregulated
investment: going from an unregulated investment to becoming an IRB-bank allows the second
bank to increase its lending volume and has no adverse eﬀect on interest rates. We summarize:
Proposition 6 With observable portfolios and the possibility of unregulated IRS-investments, if







CA) then the regulator implements one IRB-bank. In all other cases, the regulator can implement
the optimal outcome. Unregulated investments do not occur in equilibrium.
A comparison of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 shows that there is exactly one case in which
there is a change in the ﬁnal outcome, namely if there is an overinvestment situation. The option
of taking recourse to unregulated investment implies that investment cannot be prevented in this
case, so that the regulator implements one IRB-bank even though two SA-banks were optimal.
IV. Unobservable Loan Portfolios
Now we turn to the agency problems associated with improved rating capabilities. We consider
the extreme case where the regulator cannot observe the projects chosen by banks. Banks have
then full latitude to misreport the quality of their projects, and to declare risky projects to be safe
and vice versa. It follows that banks will always report the project type that is more favorable for
them, i.e. the type that is subject to the lowest capital adequacy ratio. That is, diﬀerentiating
between the capital adequacy ratios of safe and of risky projects is now meaningless, and only
bI =m i n ( bS,b R) matters. Hence, in this case there are eﬀectively only two capital requirements
that we need to consider, namely bI =m i n ( bS,b R) as the relevant ratio for IRB-banks, and bU
for SA-banks.
A. One IRB-Bank
With observable portfolios, the regulator could prevent substitution between safe and risky
projects by setting bS and bR appropriately. This is impossible when portfolios are unobserv-
able, so that we need to answer two questions: When will the IRB-bank engage in risk-shifting?
And what is the optimal response of the regulator in terms of ﬁxing the unique capital requirement
bI that is relevant for IRB-banks? Concerning the ﬁrst question, we ﬁnd:
20Lemma 2 With one IRB-bank (say Bank A) and unobservable portfolios, there exists a unique
threshold ¯ nA such that Bank A chooses cherry-picking if nA ≤ ¯ nA and risk-shifting if nA > ¯ nA.
The threshold ¯ nA is strictly increasing in E and k over the interval ¯ nA ∈ (0,E+ k).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that the IRB-bank’s incentive to give priority to risky projects is increasing
in the total number of projects funded: The smaller the portfolio, the lower is the bankruptcy
probability if risky projects are chosen. And since the advantage of risky projects is precisely
that limited liability allows to keep the upside and hedges against the downside of their riskier
cash ﬂows, it follows that the higher expected project return of safe projects dominates for small
portfolios, whereas the higher variance of risky projects dominates for large portfolios. An increase
in k means that safe projects are more attractive, and an increase in E means that the bank has
more to lose in case of bankruptcy. Given Lemma 2, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 7 With one IRB-bank (say Bank A) and unobservable portfolios, the regulator’s
optimal choice of nA depends on the parameters E and k: (i) Region 1: If ¯ nA ≥ E + k, then the
regulator sets nA = E +k,B a n kA opts for cherry-picking and will be risk-free. ¯ nA ≥ E +k holds
if E and k are suﬃciently large. (ii) Region 2: If 1
2 ≤ ¯ nA <E+ k, the regulator implements
nA =¯ nA,B a n kA opts for cherry-picking and will be risk-free. ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 holds for intermediate
values of E and k. (iii) Region 3:I f¯ nA < 1
2, the regulator cannot avoid risk-shifting. Bank A
funds all risky projects, and Bank B funds all safe projects. ¯ nA < 1
2 holds if E and k are small.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 divides the parameter space into three regions. In Region 1, risk-shifting is no
problem and we get the same solution as with observable portfolios. But outside this region, the
agency problems caused by unobservable portfolios lead to higher bankruptcy costs because the
regulator cannot implement the optimal allocation: In Region 2, the IRB-bank would engage in
risk-shifting for nA = E + k, and the best the regulator can do is to implement ¯ nA,i . e . t h e
maximum number of projects where risk-shifting is avoided. The IRB-bank is still the larger one,
and all safe and some risky projects are sheltered from bankruptcy risk.
In Region 3, Bank A would opt for risk-shifting even if nA < 1
2. We can show that in principle
it would then be optimal to make the IRB-bank A the smaller bank, and to allocate either
21nA =¯ nA safe or nA =¯ nA + ε risky projects to Bank A. However, allocating less projects to
an IRB-bank than to a SA-bank is excluded by the assumption that bS ≤ bU. Since portfolios
are unobservable, the bank can declare all projects as safe ones, so that nA ≥ nB.A n d g i v e n
Assumption L, nA ≥ 1
2 follows.19
B. Two IRB-Banks
With two IRB-banks and unobservable portfolios, it is impossible to implement diﬀerent capital
requirements for diﬀerent types of projects or for diﬀerent banks. Hence, there will be a single
eﬀective capital requirement bI and the lending volumes will be identical, nA = nB = 1
2.T h e
outcome is then the same as it would have been with two IRS-banks and unregulated investments
(see Section 4.4)20 - both banks fund half of the projects and portfolios and interest rates need to
yield identical proﬁts for both banks. We summarize the outcome as follows:
Proposition 8 With two IRB-banks and unobservable portfolios, there are two possible outcomes





, then one bank (say bank A) funds all safe projects,
and the other bank funds all risky projects. Both banks earn equal proﬁts, and interest rates are











, then each bank ﬁnances one half of the safe and one half of the risky projects,
and interest rates are RS = RR =2 . Total bankruptcy costs are the same as with two SA-banks,
Zu = z (1 − 2E − k).
Proof. See Appendix.
The logic behind Proposition 8 follows that of Proposition 3. The only diﬀerence is that both
banks now ﬁnance the same number of projects because the regulator cannot diﬀerentiate the
capital requirements for safe and risky projects when portfolios are unobservable. Since bank
proﬁts are higher when funding either safe or risky projects, banks will do so whenever this
is compatible with the equilibrium requirement of identical proﬁt s . T h i si st r u ei nc a s e(i) of
19The assumption bS ≤ bU is realistic but from a theory point of view not always optimal. For some parameter
values the regulator would prefer bS >b U to curtail the possibility that an IRB-bank engages in risk-taking. The
IRB-bank would then be the smaller bank, and hence investment subsidies are typically needed. A full analysis of
this case is available from the authors.
20As shown in section 4.4, however, this was no subgame perfect equilibrium as one bank will demand an IRB-
licence.
22Proposition 8, and competition will reduce the safe interest rate RS until banks are indiﬀerent
between the two portfolios. In case (ii), an adjustment of interest rates is not feasible, as the
possibility that safe projects imitate risky ones imposes the condition RS ≤ RR.H e n c e , a s i n
Proposition 3, we get the same outcome as with two SA-banks.
C. Comparison and Optimal Regulation
The following Lemma summarizes the comparison of the bankruptcy losses in the diﬀerent regimes
(subscript n for “nonobservable”):
Lemma 3 (i) Zn(1) <Z u if ¯ nA is large (Region 1 and large values of E and k in Region 2)
and Zn(1) >Z u if ¯ nA is small (Region 3 and small values of E and k in Region 2). (ii) Two
IRB-banks are always dominated by either one IRB-Bank or two SA-banks.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 3 shows that one IRB-bank is the dominant regime for large values of ¯ nA,
and two SA-banks dominate if ¯ nA is small, neglecting investment costs. By contrast, one IRB-
bank was always superior with observable portfolios (Proposition 4). Thus, there are important
diﬀerences between the cases of observable and unobservable portfolios. In fact, we ﬁnd that in
case (i) of Proposition 3 the allocation with two IRB-banks is dominated by one IRB-bank in
all regions since two IRB-banks imply a lower safe interest rate RS and a smaller portfolio of
the default-free bank than one IRB-bank. In case (ii) of Proposition 3 on the other hand, two
IRB-banks are dominated by two SA-banks, as they lead to an equivalent project allocation, and
hence IRS-investments that would be wasted. It follows that two IRB-banks can never be optimal.
Next, we analyze whether subsidies or taxes can ensure that investment decisions are optimal.
As in the case of observable portfolios, there may be over- or underinvestment incentives. As an
example, consider Region 2: we know from Lemma 3 that in this case total bankruptcy costs may
be lowest when there are two SA-banks. However, Bank A’s proﬁti sa l w a y sh i g h e rw h e ni ti n v e s t s
(ΠA
n(1) − Πu > 0)a snA > 1
2 by deﬁnition of Region 2. The best available outcomes, from the
point of view of the regulator, are those summarized in Proposition 7 that takes account of the
constraint that risk-shifting concerns impose on the lending volume of an IRB-bank. We obtain:
23Proposition 9 Suppose the portfolio choice is unobservable. Then, the regulator can always
uniquely implement the best available outcome:
(i) If Zu − Zn(1) ≥ CA,o n l yB a n kA invests and ﬁnances nA =m i n
©
max{1
2, ¯ nA},E+ k
ª
projects. There is a subsidy if CA > ΠA
n(1) − Πu.




Proposition 9 says that the regulator can again attain the optimal investment decisions. As
i nt h ec a s eo fo b s e r v a b l ep o r t f o l i o s ,t h em a i nr e a s o ni st h a tB a n kB has no incentive to become a
second IRB-bank as competition for projects would then reduce proﬁts. The use of subsidies and
taxes to implement the optimum is virtually the same as in Proposition 5. These instruments will
optimally discriminate between Bank A’s investment incentives and those of Bank B as CA <C B.
D. Unregulated Investments
For the same reason as with observable loan portfolios, it will never occur that both banks invest
in an IRS without applying for a license, or that one bank becomes an IRB-bank while the other
makes an unregulated investment. Again, however, we need to analyze Bank A’s incentive to
engage in unregulated investment if Bank B is a SA-bank.
If so, Bank A can ﬁnance nA = 1
2, and it will fund either only risky or only safe projects. This
closely resembles the case with unregulated investments and observable portfolios, so that Bank






− Πu >C A,
holds. In this case, the regulator cannot avoid the investment anyway, and it is then better to
solicit applications for an IRB-license, and to implement ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 rather than nA = 1
2.W e c a n
summarize as follows:
Corollary 1 Suppose banks can undertake unregulated IRS-investments and the portfolio choice
is unobservable. Whenever one IRB-bank is the optimal outcome, the regulator will implement this
outcome. If two SA-banks are the optimal outcome, then the regulator will be able to implement






− Πu ≤ CA and otherwise implement the outcome with one IRB-
bank. In equilibrium, unregulated investments do not occur.
24The diﬀerent outcomes in the case of observable and of unobservable portfolios are quite
similar, as the comparison of Proposition 6 and Corollary 1 shows. In other words, if agency
problems concerning the truthful reporting of the bank’s information become more severe this will
reduce the optimal lending volume of an IRB-bank but not fundamentally alter the regulatory
trade-oﬀ.
From this vantage point, it is interesting to revisit the comparison to Basel I. Under Basel I
rules, the regulator will not be able to prevent banks from investing, but such investments will
always be tantamount to unregulated investments since there is no diﬀerentiation of regulatory
regimes, and the allocation will always be nA = nB = 1
2. Therefore, the transition to Basel II
will strictly improve the allocation in two cases: ﬁrst, if investment by one IRB-bank is optimal;
second, if overinvestment in internal rating systems cannot be avoided so that Basel II allows for
optimal accommodation. In summary, Basel II is superior whenever at least one bank invests,
and Basel I and Basel II are equivalent otherwise.
V. Possible Extensions and Discussion
In this Section, we brieﬂy discuss how our results would be aﬀected if we relaxed some of our key
assumptions.
A. Bankruptcy Costs
We begin with the assumption of linear bankruptcy costs made to ensure the formal tractability
and closed form characterization of our analysis. We do not have a strong view whether a neoclas-
sical assumption of convex bankruptcy losses, or rather concave costs reﬂecting some economies
of scale in the social response to a bank’s failure would be the natural extension, and so the linear
case may be viewed as a compromise between these two conﬂicting views. As long as bankruptcy
losses are assumed to be increasing (convex, linear, or concave), the qualitative message of our
model should go through.
B. Lending Volume
If we relax Assumption L that limits the number of necessary case distinctions in our analysis
then the volume of ﬁnancing becomes endogenous. In this case, it is easy to show that the
regulator either implements all projects (the case analyzed) or the maximum number of projects
25that avoids any bankruptcy risk for both banks. The intuition for this corner solution is that
marginal expected bankruptcy costs are decreasing in the number of projects funded, so that
there is no interior solution. The regulator will avoid the bankruptcy risk if z is high. Then,
the total number of projects depends on the number of IRB-banks. However, with observable
loan portfolios, it will normally still be the case that one IRB-bank is the optimal allocation.
Allocating again E + k projects to the IRB-bank, both banks together can fund 2E + k projects
without facing any bankruptcy risk. All safe projects are funded. With two SA-banks, the two
banks together can also ﬁnance 2E + k projects, but some of the projects will be risky, which
reduces overall welfare. The exact welfare ranking between these two outcomes depends on the
relative size of XR and XS on which we have not made assumptions. Thus, one IRB-bank will
be preferable to two SA-banks under the (reasonable) assumption that safe projects are better
than risky projects from the point of view of social welfare. With unobservable loan portfolios,
the analysis is more complex as it also depends on the risk-shifting incentives, but it can still be
shown that either one IRB-bank or two SA-banks are optimal.
Since this paper focuses on the consequences of the two-layer approach of Basel II and the
possible diﬀerentiation that it aﬀords, our analysis clearly neglects important aspects of Basel II:
Improved screening capabilities may enhance the overall quality of loan portfolios and thus reduce
bank failure risks if more safe projects and less risky projects are funded in the economy. Our
model focuses on the heightened risk-taking incentives that will be the result of more competition
among IRB-banks and lower interest rates, but positive eﬀects of lower interest rates could be
added to complete the picture. Along the lines of our model, such eﬀects could be taken into
account by assuming that the universe of available projects is larger than the unit interval. As-
suming that the cash ﬂow XS(nS) is a declining function of the number nS of safe projects funded,
more safe projects will seek ﬁnancing as RS decreases. The competition eﬀect of two IRB-banks
would then lead to more lending to safe projects and corresponding positive welfare eﬀects. This
would shift the comparison between the scenario of one IRB-bank and two IRB-banks in favor of
the latter, so that the former ceases to be the dominant outcome in all cases.
C. Heterogeneity and Endogeneity of Bank Equity
Furthermore, we assume that equity E is identical for both banks and exogenously given. Relax-
ing this assumption, one could ﬁrst assume that total equity is still 2E, but unequally divided
26between the two banks. Then, we have shown that again one IRB-bank or two SA-banks are
optimal, and whether the regulator can implement the desired outcome with subsidies or taxes
is a straightforward adaptation of the symmetric case. More interestingly, one could assume
that the equity of a bank emerges endogenously as a function of the bank’s proﬁtability. Then,
we would get two eﬀects: First, market forces would reallocate equity from the SA-bank to the
IRB-bank as the latter is more proﬁtable. In equilibrium, the expected return on equity is the
same in both banks, and the case can then be discussed along the lines with exogenously given,
but unevenly distributed equity. Second, since the proﬁtability of the banking sector is higher
with one IRB-bank, one should observe an inﬂow of capital into the banking sector which further
decreases expected bankruptcy costs.
D. Masquerading of Projects
We assumed that safe projects can always masquerade as risky projects. This assumption guaran-
tees realistic loan pricing, viz. to loan rate for safe projects weakly below those for projects with
higher default risk. We can show that when we remove this assumption, the essence of our analysis
is unaﬀected. But interestingly, with two IRB-banks it may occur that RS >R R.W h i l eb e i n g
counterfactual, this outcome is in fact an intuitive and robust feature of a general equilibrium
model in loan markets if the incentives for risk-shifting are strong, which in our model corresponds
to case in which the diﬀerence in expected returns, k − 1
2, is small. Competition among multi-
ple risk-neutral lenders will then typically imply an equilibrium in which risky projects that are
preferred because of risk-shifting motives earn a lower expected return. However, this is unlikely
to occur in reality for several reasons, including notably risk aversion, and our masquerading
assumption is a simple way of capturing those.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes consequences of the Basel II Accord by taking account of general equilibrium
eﬀects on the loan market. We consider a simple model in which two banks can invest to improve
their internal credit screening capacities. The regulator wants to allocate a ﬁxed amount of
proﬁtable projects among banks in order to minimize the overall expected costs of bank failure.
These costs depend on two variables: the diﬀerentiation in size and composition of the loan
portfolios, and the interest rates.
27In this setting, our analysis reveals an original positive eﬀect of the Basel II two-layer approach
that diﬀerentiates the capital adequacy ratios between IRB-banks and SA-banks: it allows to
better exploit economies of scale in the allocation of systematic risks by optimally adjusting the
size and portfolio structure of the two segments within the banking sector. IRB-banks should
receive incentives to keep their loan portfolios safe and bank failure risks should be conﬁned to
SA-banks. While the two-layer approach initially has been conceived as a transitional regime,
our analysis reveals it as a very attractive feature of the Basel II architecture. There is no need
to strive for homogeneity among banks. Ultimately, bank diﬀerentiation could give rise to more
rather than less investment in internal rating systems if the yardstick that separates between the
two layers of the banking sector adjusts dynamically to the state-of-the-art credit information
technologies. In our model, the regulator never wants both banks to invest in internal rating
systems as two IRB-banks reduce the diﬀerentiation advantage. While the portfolio composition
remains fully diﬀerentiated, the size allocation is suboptimal.
The regulator can almost always implement the preferred outcome which is one IRB-bank
for low and two SA-banks for high investment costs, with one important exception: if the bank
can make an unregulated investment and if its incentive to invest is substantially larger than the
regulator’s and the bank, then the regulator optimally accommodates the bank’s investment.
If the regulator can observe the banks’ portfolios, it is possible to fully reap the diﬀerentiation
advantage of Basel II. In this case, the regulator gives incentives to the IRB-bank to ﬁnance all
safe projects and the maximum number of risky projects that keep it default-free. If the regulator
cannot fully observe the IRB-bank’s portfolio, however, the bank might opportunistically abuse
its screening capabilities to fund risky projects and to misreport its portfolio to the regulator. The
regulator may then be unable to fully exploit the size diﬀerentiation eﬀect, since the possibility
to underreport portfolio risks introduces new constraints. The regulator then needs to restrict
the lending volume of the IRB-bank as risk-taking incentives grow in the size of bank assets and
bank leverage. This constraint reduces social welfare compared to the observability case, but will
leave the main ﬁndings of our analysis unchanged.
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Proof of Lemma 1.W eu s et h en o t a t i o nnA
R = nA − nA
S for the quantity of risky projects that the bank
ﬁnances in addition to nA
S safe projects. The proﬁt ΠA of the bank can then be written as:




t| t ≥ ˜ tA¤
RRnA
R + E − nA










, subject to the bank’s equity constraint (7). For the
bankruptcy threshold and the conditional expectation we get from (10):
˜ tA =m a x
½
nA
























Eq. (11) implicitly deﬁnes a threshold value of nA
R =¯ n = E +( kRS − 1)nA
S such that ˜ tA =0for all
nA
R ≤ ¯ n and ˜ tA > 0 for all nA
R > ¯ n. Substituting for ˜ tA and E
£
t | t ≥ ˜ tA¤
in Eq. (10) and rearranging,







R + E − nA
R +( kRS − 1)nA
S if nA






R + E − nA
R +( kRS − 1)nA
S
¢2 if nA
R > ¯ n
. (13)
Inspection of (10) shows that ΠA must be continuous at the point ¯ n.I f RR < 1, Lemma 1 follows
trivially: the bank will never adopt risky projects if RR < 1, since in all states t ∈ (0,1), risky projects
will lead to a reduced payoﬀ. Therefore, we need only to consider RR ≥ 1.
Concerning the choice of safe projects, since RS ≥ 1
k and RR ≥ 1, it follows that proﬁts are increasing
in nA
S,i nb o t hr e g i o n snA
R ≤ ¯ n and also if nA
R > ¯ n.
Concerning the choice of risky projects, consider ﬁrst the region nA
R ≤ ¯ n.I f nA
R ≤ ¯ n, ΠA is a linear
function of nA
R.M o r e o v e r ,nA
R =¯ n cannot be a local maximum and if RR ≤ 2,t h e nΠA cannot be increasing
in nA
R. Thus, the bank will optimally either ﬁnance no risky projects, nA
R =0 ,o ri fRR =2be indiﬀerent
among all nA
R ≤ ¯ n, or the optimum lies outside the considered range nA
R ≤ ¯ n.
Consider then the region nA
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E +( kRS − 1)nA
S
¢2´
− λbR − µ2 =0 . (16)
31Since RS ≥ 1
k and RR ≥ 1, from condition (15) it follows that either λ>0 or µ1 > 0,o rb o t h .
First, consider the case λ =0(the equity constraint is slack). Then µ1 > 0, i.e. the bank will ﬁnance
nA
S = 1
2 safe projects. To determine the bank’s optimal quantity nA
R, consider the unconstrained problem



















Thus, ΠA is strictly convex in nA
R. We have already seen that ΠA is linear in nA
R for nA
R ≤ ¯ n. Hence
only boundary solutions can be optimal. Thus, either nA
R ≤ ¯ n or nA
R = 1
2.
Second, consider the case λ>0 (the equity constraint is binding). Constraint (7) can then be written
as
nA









S in (13) yields for values nA
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Moreover, ΠA is continuous and piecewise diﬀerentiable in nA
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Expressions (18) and (19) show that ΠA is piecewise strictly convex over the entire range nA
R > ¯ n.O n l y
boundary points for nA
R can be optimal. Hence, either nA
R ≤ ¯ n or nA
R = 1
2,o rnA
R is bounded by the budget
constraint. Together with the result that the bank will always increase the number of safe projects until
the budget constraint binds, we have shown Lemma 1. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .We show that (i) the allocation given in Proposition 2 minimizes total bank-
ruptcy costs and is hence optimal, and then (ii) that the allocation is implementable.
Part (i). First note that RS = RR =2because the marginal project is risky, and because the IRB-bank
only needs to undercut the interest rate marginally to attract all safe projects. Also, RS = RR =2implies
that safe projects do not have an incentive to masquerade as risky one.
We prove more generally for later use that allocating nA = 1
2kRS + E projects to the IRB-bank is




.L e t ZA (ZB) be the bankruptcy loss from the IRB-bank A (the SA-bank B).
From

















˜ tA =m a x
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and for the SA-bank B we get
˜ tB =m a x
½









= nA˜ tAz +( 1− nA)˜ tBz (22)
=
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2 − 8nA > 0 ,
which proves that Z is increasing in nA if nA > 1
2kRS + E,i . e .i fB a n kA faces a positive bankruptcy
risk. Otherwise, if only Bank B may go bankrupt, total bankruptcy costs are simply
Z = ZB =
1 − nA − E
2
z, (23)







∂nA > 0 if nA > 1
2kRS + E and ∂Z
∂nA < 0 if nA < 1
2kRS + E, it is optimal to implement
nA = 1
2kRS + E. For the special case in Proposition 2, we have RS =2and thus nA = E + k.
Part (ii). Suppose the regulator chooses bS =0 , bR = E
E+k− 1
2
and bU = E
1−E−k as stated in the Proposition.
Then, the IRB-bank needs no equity to fund all safe projects, and can fund exactly E+k− 1
2 risky projects.
Funding more risky projects is impossible as bR is binding. For the SA-bank, there are no safe projects
left, and it can fund nB =1− E − k risky projects. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Part (i). From Lemma 1, we know that proﬁts are convex in the number of safe
projects, so that there are no incentives for marginal deviations. Furthermore, we know from the proof of
Proposition 2 that total bankruptcy costs are minimized for ˜ nA ≡ E + 1
2kRS.B yd e ﬁnition of case (i),w e
have ΠA(˜ nA) ≥ ΠB for RS = RR =2 . For the minimum RS = 1
k we have ΠB ≥ ΠA(˜ nA). We show that
d(ΠB−ΠA)





























2k>0.F o rB a n kB,w eh a v e






































2 < 0 ,
as nA < 1 − E is implied by the absence of bankruptcy risk of Bank A.S i n c edΠA
dRS > 0 while dΠB
dRS < 0,w e
have
d(ΠB−ΠA)
dRS < 0. Next, we show that there exist capital requirements that implement every ˜ nA ≤ 3
4:
bR = E
1−˜ nA allows Bank B to exactly fund 1 − ˜ nA risky projects, and bS ≥ 0 will be chosen so that Bank
A can fund all safe and ˜ nA − 1






The threshold ˆ k(E) is derived as follows. If RS = RR =2 , and if Bank A ﬁnances the maximum default-
free portfolio ˜ nA = E + k,t h e nΠA = k − 1
2 + E and ΠB =
(1−k)2
4(1−k−E). This implies that ΠA(E + k) ≥ ΠB





−2E − 4E2 +1 . Moreover, it is straightforward to show that ˆ k(E) < 3
4.
Part (ii).I nt h i sc a s e ,ΠA(˜ nA) < ΠB for RS = RR =2 .W eﬁrst construct the equilibrium and then
show that it is unique. RS > 2 is excluded by outside competition. RR < 2 is also excluded as safe projects
would masquerade as risky projects in order to get the lower interest rate. Hence, only equilibria with
identical interest rates are possible, and from all these equilibria, the regulator prefers the one with the
highest rates, hence RR = RS =2 . An equilibrium then requires that proﬁts of both banks are identical.
Since ΠA(˜ nA) < ΠB for RS = RR =2 , each bank wants to fund all safe projects. However, in this
equilibrium all safe projects masquerade as risky projects, thus becoming indistinguishable for the two
IRB-banks. Thus, in equilibrium projects are randomly allocated and each bank funds half of the safe and
half of the risky projects, leading to equal proﬁts. This will only be the case if. Next, the equilibrium is
unique: RR >R S cannot be an equilibrium by deﬁnition of the case considered. RR <R S is not feasible
because of the masquerading assumption. RR = RS < 2 is not possible in equilibrium because the regulator
prefers higher rates and can implement them by binding capital requirements. And in any asymmetric
equilibria, either Bank A gets lower proﬁts (when ﬁnancing n ≤ ˜ nA projects) and thus would undercut
the rate for risky projects to take Bank B’s position, or it faces positive bankruptcy risk (when ﬁnancing
n>˜ nA projects). But then, total bankruptcy costs are higher than in the symmetric equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . We already know that Zo(1) = z 1−2E−k
2 and Zu =1 −2E−k,t h u sZu−Zo(1) =
z 1−2E−k
2 > 0. With two IRB-banks, call total bankruptcy costs in case (i) of Proposition 3 Zo(2i) and
in case (ii) of Proposition 3, Zo(2ii).I n c a s e (ii) we have Zo(2ii)=Zu >Z o(1).I n c a s e (i),w eh a v e
Zo(2i)=z 1−nA−E
2 >Z o(1) = z 1−2E−k
2 if nA <E+k.A n ds i n c enA = E +k is only feasible in the special
case where ΠA(nA = E + k,RS = RR =2 )=ΠB(RS = RR =2 ) , the result follows. ¥
34P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Since all other elements of the proof are provided in the text, this proof only
covers the remaining claim that ˆ ΠB
o (2) = ΠB
o (1) i nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hw i t hnA = E + k>3
4. We need to
consider the equilibrium proﬁts of two IRB-banks with the capital requirements that are optimal in the
case of one IRB-bank, bS =0and bR = E
E+k− 1
2
.S i n c ebS =0 , the two banks will compete for safe projects
until the interest factor is so low that all proﬁts from safe projects are eliminated, RS = 1
k.M o r e o v e r ,
with bR = E
E+k− 1
2
the capital constraints cannot be binding for both banks under any allocation in which
they ﬁnance all risky projects. To see that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, consider a bank i
with a nonbinding capital constraint. There can be no pure strategy equilibrium in which RR is so high
that Bank i earns a positive proﬁt. Suppose that RR is so low that its payoﬀ is equal to E,s ot h a ti is
indiﬀerent between funding the projects or not. This cannot be an equilibrium as Bank i would cut RR
further, attract more risky projects and gain a higher proﬁt. But if its payoﬀ Πi is smaller than E,t h a n
the bank prefers to ﬁnance zero projects.
Thus, we need to consider equilibria where both banks choose mixed strategies concerning their stated
interest factors RR. In such an equilibrium, the bank that announces the lower rate ﬁnances the maximum
feasible number of risky projects until its capital constraint is reached, nA = E
bR = E + k − 1
2 > 1
2.T h e
other bank funds 1 − nA risky projects. The minimum interest factor Rmin
R < 2 is given by the condition
that the bank just gets a payoﬀ of E when ﬁnancing E + k − 1
2 risky projects. All interest factors over





must have positive support as otherwise there would be strategies RR
where banks could deviate to a marginally higher rate without altering the probability of becoming the
large bank that ﬁnances E + k − 1
2 risky projects. Hence, RR =2has positive support. For RR =2 ,
however, the bank becomes the small one with probability one as there are inﬁnitely many interest rates.
And since in any mixed strategy equilibrium the bank must be indiﬀerent between all interest rates in the
support, expected proﬁts with all interest rates are ˆ ΠB(2) = ΠB(1) =
(1−k)2
4(1−k−E). ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . To prove Lemma 2, we begin with the following Lemma that allows us to restrict
attention to the properties of ¯ nA:
Lemma 4. There can be at most a single threshold ¯ nA where Bank A switches from cherry-picking to
risk-shifting.
Proof. We restrict attention to the case where nA ∈ (1
2,E+ k) as nA < 1
2 cannot be implemented due to
bS ≤ bU.( T h ep r o o ff o rnA < 1













R + E − nA , (24)
as the bank faces no bankruptcy risk. For proﬁts with risk-shifting, by using the proﬁt expression from










+ E − nA¢2
R
. (25)
Let ∆ΠA = ΠA
S − ΠA
R denote the proﬁtd i ﬀerence. From Lemma 1, we know that in equilibrium there
will be either cherry-picking or risk-shifting, so that R =2or R = 1
k are the only possible equilibrium













− k +4 knA − 2kE + R
¡
k2 − k − 2k2nA¢
. (26)
If R =2 ,w eg e t :
∂∆ΠA
∂nA = −(2k − 1)
¡
E − nA − k +2 knA +1
¢
< 0, (27)
and if R = 1
k,w eg e t :
∂∆ΠA





Second, consider nA >E+ k.I nt h i sc a s e ,B a n kA will no longer be defaultfree when cherry-picking,
and hence we get as proﬁt expression in the cherry-picking case:
ΠA
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2E − R + Rk − 2nA +2 RnA¢2
4(2nA − 1)R
.




E − 1+k + nA¢2
(2nA − 1)
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k + nA + E − 1
¢¶¶
< 0.














+ E − nA
¶2!
=2( 2 k − 1)
¡
E − nA − k +2 knA +1
¢
> 0.
Taking together, this shows again that ∂∆ΠA
∂nA < 0. ¥
G i v e nL e m m a4 ,w ec a nn o wd e r i v eac l o s e de x p r e s s i o nf o r¯ nA ≥ 1
2 as stated in the text. Consider the
case where nA =¯ nA and where R =2 . Substituting into the proﬁt expression yields for any nA =¯ nA ≤
E + k:
ΠA




which is independent of nA as risky projects just break even. If Bank A deviated to risk-shifting, then





























36which we can solve as:
¯ nA =
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
. (29)


































It remains to show that ¯ nA is monotonic in k and E. We take the expression for ¯ nA in (29) and analyze

















E − k −
√
2k +2 E − 1+1
´
.
As u ﬃcient condition for this expression to be positive is:
¡√
2k +2 E − 1 − 4E − 2k +2 E
√
2k +2 E − 1+1
¢
√
2k +2 E − 1
> 0.
This is positive if the numerator is positive, or if
(1 + 2E)
√
2k +2 E − 1 > 4E +2 k − 1.
After taking squares and rearranging, we ﬁnd that this must be true since
¡
4E2 − 2E − 2k +1
¢
=2 E (2E − 1) + 1 − 2k<0,
which shows that ¯ nA is monotonic in k.













P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .Part (i). We already know that nA = E + k is optimal in the class of cherry-
picking allocations, and this allocation is feasible in Region 1 by deﬁnition. Finally, the proof of part (ii)
below implies that nA = E + k is superior to any risk-shifting allocation.
Part (ii). Here, we consider situations where the optimal nA = E + k without risk-shifting is not feasible
as ¯ nA <E+ k.W ep r o v et h a tnA =¯ nA > 1
2 is optimal. Consider ﬁrst the case nA > ¯ nA, meaning that
Bank A is risk-shifting. Then, Bank B faces no bankruptcy risk, and Bank A earns proﬁts of
ΠA












R + E − nA
¸
. (32)
37Note that R = 1
k, since we analyze bankruptcy costs in an equilibrium with risk-shifting, so that the
projects expected by Bank B are all safe ones. Thus, the expected bankruptcy probability, again obtained
as the marginal t where [.]=0in Eq. (32), is ˜ tA = k(1 − 2E). Hence,
ZR(nA)=nAzk(1 − 2E), (33)
and ∂ZR
∂nA = zk(1 − 2E) > 0.T h u s ,given risk-shifting, nA =¯ nA + ε would be optimal.
Bankruptcy costs with cherry-picking are ZS(¯ nA)=1
2z
¡
1 − ¯ nA − E
¢
, since only Bank B faces positive
bankruptcy risk. Hence, we have





1 − ¯ nA − E
¢












w h e r ew em a d eu s eo fnA ≥ 1
2, ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 and k ≥ 1
2.N o t et h a tnA < nA cannot be optimal as the safe
bank were unnecessarily small.
Part (iii).S i n c et h eI R B - b a n kA opts for risk-shifting for all feasible nA ≥ 1
2, total expected bankruptcy
costs are minimized for nA = 1
2 and are independent of whether Bank A funds all safe or all risky projects.
Bankruptcy costs Z(nA) are
Z (1/2) = z˜ tAnA = z
nA − E










Proof of Proposition 8. We know that nA = nB = 1
2 and that proﬁts need to be identical. Case (i).
Suppose Bank A funds all safe projects and Bank B funds all risky projects. Then, for RS = RR =2 ,w e





.A n ds i n c e∂ΠA
∂RS > 0,p r o ﬁts of the two banks are equalized in case (i) by











proﬁts of the two banks could only be identical if Bank A funded
all safe projects and Bank B funded all risky projects, and if at the same time RS >R R.T h i so u t c o m e ,
however, is impossible beas safe projects would masquerade as risky projects and get the lower interest
rate RR. Therefore, in the unique SPE in case (ii), both banks must fund identical mixed portfolios (the
details are exactly as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, case (ii)) .T h eo u t c o m ei st h es a m ea sw i t ht w o
SA-banks, and total bankruptcy costs are Zu = z (1 − 2E − k). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Part (i).W ek n o wf r o mP r o p o s i t i o n4t h a tZn(1) − Zu = −z (1 − k − 2E) < 0 in
Region 1. In Regions 2 and 3, however, it can easily be shown that Zn <Z u for the minimum k = 1
2
whereas Zn >Z u for the maximum k =1− E, hence Zn ≶ Zu.
Part (ii). As argued, two diﬀerent allocations may arise with two IRB-banks,depending on the parameters:
In case (i) of Proposition 8, Bank A is default-free and RS < 2 whereas in case (ii) both banks fund
identical mixed portfolios mix and have positive bankruptcy risk. Let us again denote by Zn(2i) and










2 − k − E
¢
< 0 as k ≥ 1
2.L e t nSUP =s u p
©
¯ nA,1 − ¯ nAª
. Note that in Regions 2 and
3, Zn(1) ≤ 1
2z
¡
1 − nSUP − E
¢
.T h e n Zn(1) ≤ Zn(2i) follows from 1
2
¡








Next, since the allocation in case (ii) with two IRB-banks is the same as with two SA-Banks, we have
ZU = Zn(2ii). And since investment costs accrue only with two IRB-banks, this is inferior to two SA-
banks. It follows that that in case (i), two IRB-banks are dominated by one IRB-bank, and case (ii) they
are dominated by two SA-banks.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . Following Proposition 5, we know that ˆ ΠB
n(2) − ΠB
n(1) ≤ 0 is a suﬃcient
condition that the optimal regulation can be implemented, where ˆ ΠB
n(2) is the proﬁto fB a n kB with two
IRB-banks given that capital requirements are those that are optimal if there is one IRB-bank.
Any possible equilibrium with a positive number of projects funded requires that ΠA = ΠB ≥ E.
In equilibrium, the eﬀective capital requirement for both banks will be bI =m i n {bS,b R} as proﬁts are
increasing in the number of projects. Since bS ≤ bU, and as we have bS =0 , each bank can ﬁnance all
projects.
This implies that in any possible equilibrium, RS = 1
k, since there must be at least one bank that
does not ﬁnance all safe projects and that has a nonbinding capital constraint. RS = 1
k implies that the
marginal proﬁto fﬁnancing safe projects is zero regardless of whether a bank faces positive bankruptcy
risk or not. Hence, any equilibrium allocation of safe projects between the two banks is possible. A bank
that ﬁnances only safe projects will earn E.
Suppose that one of the banks (Bank B,s a y )ﬁnances some risky projects in equilibrium and faces
positive bankruptcy risk. Suppose that Bank A also ﬁnances some risky projects. In any equilibrium, RR
must be large enough to ensure ΠB ≥ E. But then Bank B’s proﬁt would strictly increase in the number
of risky projects it ﬁnances, hence B would attract some risky projects that A ﬁnances by undercutting
RR. It follows that if Bank B faces bankruptcy risk, there cannot be an equilibrium where both B and A
ﬁnance risky projects, and one of the banks will in equilibrium ﬁnance all risky projects.
If Bank B ﬁnances all risky projects, then Bank A ﬁnances only safe projects and earns E. Therefore,
if Bank B earns more than E,w ew o u l dh a v eΠA < ΠB and violate the equilibrium conditions: Bank A
would undercut B to attract all risky projects. It follows that RR will be such that both banks earn just
E in equilibrium. Hence, ˆ ΠB
n(2) = E, which implies ˆ ΠB
n(2) − ΠB
n(1) ≤ 0. ¥
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